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Many in the eyewitness identification community believe that sequential lineups are superior to simultaneous
lineups because simultaneous lineups encourage inappropriate choosing due to promoting comparisons
among choices (a relative judgment strategy), but sequential lineups reduce this propensity by inducing
comparisons of lineup members directly to memory rather than to each other (an absolute judgment
strategy). Different versions of the relative judgment theory have implicated both discrete-state and
continuous mediation of eyewitness decisions. The theory has never been formally specified, but (Yonelinas,
J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 20:1341–1354, 1994) dual-process models provide one possible specification,
thereby allowing us to evaluate how eyewitness decisions are mediated. We utilized a ranking task (Kellen
and Klauer, J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 40:1795–1804, 2014) and found evidence for continuous
mediation when facial stimuli match from study to test (Experiment 1) and when they mismatch (Experiment
2). This evidence, which is contrary to a version of relative judgment theory that has gained a lot of traction
in the legal community, compels reassessment of the role that guessing plays in eyewitness identification.
Future research should continue to test formal explanations in order to advance theory, expedite the
development of new procedures that can enhance the reliability of eyewitness evidence, and to facilitate the
exploration of task factors and emergent strategies that might influence when recognition is continuously or
discretely mediated.
Keywords: Eyewitness identification, Facial recognition, One-high-threshold (1HT) model, Signal-detection
theory (SDT), Relative and absolute judgmentsSignificance statement
It is vital to understand the processes that underlie eye-
witness identification because faulty eyewitness identifi-
cation is a primary contributor to wrongful convictions
(contributing to 72 % of the wrongful convictions liti-
gated by the Innocence Project). Our experiments com-
bine elements from basic memory theory with the
important applied question of how memory for a perpet-
rator is evaluated by an eyewitness. Using a paradigm
that has a clear resemblance to a police photo lineup,
our studies enhance our understanding of the theory
underlying eyewitness identification by providing evi-
dence that facial recognition is continuously mediated.
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guessing process, the results point to existing theories
that are better suited to handle the data.Background
Faulty eyewitness identification (ID) has contributed to
the wrongful conviction of hundreds of innocent men
and women, playing a role in 72 % of DNA exoneration
cases litigated by the Innocence Project (Innocence
Project 2015). Understanding the factors that influence
these mistaken IDs is of great theoretical and practical
interest. One such factor concerns the use of simultan-
eous or sequential lineups, but our goal here is not to
evaluate the empirical evidence marshaled for and
against sequential lineups (see Clark, Moreland, &
Gronlund 2014; Steblay, Dysart, & Wells 2011; for ais distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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Rather, our goal is to formalize and test theoretical con-
ceptualizations that have been proposed to explain the
functioning of simultaneous and sequential lineups.
The typical procedure in studies of eyewitness ID in-
volves presenting participants with a mock crime sce-
nario (usually a video) followed by a delay. Participants
are then shown either a target present lineup, containing
the guilty suspect from the video and five known inno-
cents (fillers), or a target absent lineup, containing a des-
ignated innocent suspect and five fillers. If the guilty
suspect is identified from a target present lineup, it is
counted as a correct ID. If the innocent suspect is
identified from a target absent lineup, it is counted as
a false ID. In a simultaneous lineup, eyewitnesses
view an array of (typically, six) faces presented all at
once and are tasked with identifying who they believe
to be the suspect. In a sequential lineup, faces are
presented one at a time and eyewitnesses are asked
to either identify the face as the suspect and termin-
ate the lineup or reject the face and view the next
face in the sequence. This continues until the suspect
is identified or all faces are rejected.
Lindsay and Wells (1985) were the first to compare
the sequential and simultaneous lineup procedures. In
their study, participants given a simultaneous lineup had
a correct ID rate of 0.58 and a false ID rate of 0.43. Par-
ticipants shown a sequential lineup had a correct ID rate
of 0.50 and false ID rate of 0.17. Lindsay and Wells con-
cluded that sequential lineups were superior to simul-
taneous lineups. To explain this result, Lindsay and
Wells suggested that simultaneous lineups promote the
use of relative judgments. Wells first proposed this idea,
stating that “the term relative judgment refers to the fact
that the witness seems to be choosing the lineup mem-
ber who most resembles the witnesses’ memory relative
to other lineup members” (Wells 1984, p. 92). According
to this idea, witnesses who view all the faces in a simul-
taneous lineup compare the faces of a lineup relative to
each other and choose the member that best matches
the witness’s memory.1 Relative judgments can be con-
trasted with an absolute judgment strategy, in which wit-
nesses compare faces (typically in a sequential lineup)
directly to memory rather than to each other. Lindsay
and Wells concluded that a relative judgment strategy is
not necessarily harmful in target present lineups, but
leads to higher rates of false IDs in target absent lineups.
The authors further argued that a sequential lineup
would reduce the propensity to use a relative judgment
strategy and that this would result in a lowering of the
false ID rate but would have little adverse effect on the
correct ID rate. This led to their recommendation to use
the sequential lineup in real-world settings in order to
protect the innocent from being chosen from lineups.This recommendation has been accepted by many
policymakers, as has the relative judgment theory that
supports it (Innocence Project 2015; Wells et al.
1998).
The goal of this paper is to elucidate how eyewitness
memory is mediated through the exploration of formal
conceptualizations of recognition memory and, as a re-
sult, be better equipped to evaluate theories such as the
relative judgment theory advocated by Wells and col-
leagues. As we shall see, the language of Lindsay and
Wells’s (1985) relative judgment theory, and Wells,
Steblay, and Dysart’s (2012) update, appear to invoke
two different conceptualizations of recognition memory:
discrete-state and continuous mediation. We begin with
a short description of each. We then outline the tenets
of the relative judgment theory that fit into each of these
conceptualizations and propose one possible interpret-
ation that is consistent with the language of the theory.
Next, we report two studies that empirically evaluate this
interpretation. Based on our evidence, we will then re-
evaluate the relative judgment theory and the broader
implications of our results for theories of eyewitness ID.
Discrete-state and continuous models of recognition
One class of models of recognition memory is consistent
with discrete-state mediation conceptualizations of rec-
ognition memory (e.g. Rouder & Morey 2009). This
conceptualization assumes that items can be in one of
two states in memory that affect their probability of be-
ing recognized and classified as “Old” or “New.” The
simplest model of discrete-state mediation is a single
high-threshold (1HT) model. Under this model, Old
items can be in either a detect or guess state. In the de-
tect state, Old items are able to be correctly classified as
“Old.” If an item is not detected as “Old,” it enters a
guess state in which no mnemonic information about
the item is available, and it can either be guessed as
“Old” or guessed as “New.” According to the 1HT
model, New items can only enter a guess state, from
whence it can be guessed “Old” (a false alarm) or
guessed “New” (a correct rejection).
To extend the conceptualization of discrete-state me-
diation to the eyewitness memory situation, consider the
show-up situation, where only one face is presented to
the witness. A witness is tasked with either identifying
the face as the suspect or rejecting the face. The Old
item in this case would be a guilty suspect. When pre-
sented a target present show-up (which includes the
guilty suspect), the witness will either detect the guilty
suspect as “Old” (and make a correct ID with probability
DO) or fail to detect the suspect and guess, either guess-
ing that the suspect is “Old” and making a correct ID
(with probability g), or guessing that the suspect is
“New” and rejecting the lineup (with probability 1 – g)
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guide guessing, only a response bias to endorse “Old”
versus “New.” Only guessing governs responses during a
target absent show-up.
The second model of interest invokes continuously
mediated processes underlying recognition memory. We
focus on signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets
1966; Macmillan & Creelman 2005) as an exemplar of
this class. SDT assumes that all items, both Old and
New, possess latent strength values. These strength
values vary continuously and are commonly depicted by
normal distributions, whereby most items have similar
(average) levels of strength, but some items are very
strong and some are very weak. When items are studied,
the strengths of these items increase, and the distribu-
tion of Old item strengths shifts, resulting in two over-
lapping distributions of strengths that characterize New
and Old items. These distributions can vary in degree of
overlap depending on how well Old items have been
encoded (see Fig. 2). At study, the strengths of tested
items are compared to a decision criterion (c). Items that
fall above c are classified as “Old” and items that fall
below c are classified as “New.”
To illustrate, consider again the show-up. When an
eyewitness is presented with a guilty or innocent sus-
pect, SDT posits that a suspect that falls above c will be
classified as “Old” and a suspect that falls below c will be
classified as “New.” If a guilty suspect in a target present
show-up falls above c, it will be classified as “Old” and
the witness will make a correct ID. If the guilty suspect
falls below c, it will be classified as “New” and the wit-
ness will make a false rejection. Conversely, if an inno-
cent suspect from a target absent show-up falls above c,
it will be classified as “Old” and the witness will make a
false ID; if it falls below c, it will be classified as “New”
and the witness will make a correct rejection.
Mediation of relative judgment theory
Because the relative judgment theory is a verbal rather
than formal theory, there are no explicit references toFig. 1 Show-up decision process under the 1HT model. In a target present
guessed as “Old,” a correct ID, or “New,” a false rejectionthe recognition models we just outlined. In fact, past de-
scriptions of the theory imply both discrete and continu-
ous mediation. For example, Wells et al. (2012) argued
“the higher rate of hits from the simultaneous lineup is
actually just the result of lucky guesses stemming from a
higher rate of choosing” (p. 268, emphasis added). For a
similar idea, see Penrod, Garcia, and Robertson (2005).
This language suggests discrete-state mediation because
no mnemonic information is assumed to be attached to
these non-detected stimuli. In support of this discrete-
state interpretation, Clark (2012) wrote, regarding the
relative judgment strategy, that “…it assumes an all or
nothing theory of memory, in which the witness makes a
recognition decision based on a true memory, or he or
she simply guesses…” (p. 281). Moreover, according to
Wells et al., relative judgments occur when “…the wit-
ness is unable to answer the difficult question (‘Is this
the culprit’) and instead shifts to an easier question
(‘Which is the closest?’)” (p. 268). One could
conceptualize the “shift” from asking who the culprit is
to who is closest, as similar to failing to detect the target
in a basic recognition task. But Wells (1984) stated that
“absolute processing implies that a match (i.e., between
a lineup member and one’s recollection of the perpetra-
tor) must exceed some cut-off in order to produce an
identification response” (p. 95). This language is reminis-
cent of a continuously mediated model because absolute
judgments appear to involve the comparison of lineup
members to memory, much as a strength value is com-
pared to a criterion in SDT. In fact, using SDT, Wixted
and Mickes (2014) argued that the relative judgment
theory reflected changes in response bias, or the willing-
ness to choose a suspect from a lineup. Specifically,
when faces are presented in isolation (sequentially),
there is less pressure to choose the face and a more con-
servative criterion is adopted. However, when faces are
presented simultaneously, there is more pressure to
choose and the criterion is pushed to a more liberal
level, increasing the likelihood that a filler is chosen. Re-
sponse bias refers to placement of a criterion, and is ashow-up, the guilty suspect can be detected as “Old,” a correct ID, or
Fig. 2 Depiction of SDT. New and Old items fall in two separate distributions of strength values. Tested items that fall above the criterion value (c) will
be labeled “Old” and those that fall below c will be labeled “New.” The top panel indicates a situation in which Old items have been encoded weakly,
indicated by the large degree of overlap of the New and Old distributions. The bottom panel indicates a situation in which Old items have been
encoded strongly and the distributions have separated further
McAdoo and Gronlund Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2016) 1:11 Page 4 of 12basic tenet of SDT; this idea does not fit a discrete-state
conceptualization because there is nothing to weigh evi-
dence against in discrete models.
Because different iterations of the relative judgment
theory contain facets of discrete-state and continuous
mediation, we decided to consider one possible formal
implementation of the theory, which would then allow
us to develop a hypothesis to test. We chose a dual-
process framework, specifically the model proposed by
Yonelinas (1994), and present the relative judgment the-
ory in that context. According to the dual-process
model, recognition decisions can rely on familiarity or
recollection. Recollection is an all-or-none process in
which a specific memory of studying an item either
succeeds or fails at being retrieved.2 The recollection
process in the dual-process model is discrete, analo-
gous to the detection process of the 1HT model. We
will not test this assumption because our focus is on
non-recollected decisions and how they are mediated.
There are two possibilities regarding how these deci-
sions are mediated.
One possibility, consistent with Yonelinas (1994), is
that items that are not recollected can be recognized
based on a continuous, familiarity process that operatesunder the assumptions of SDT. This seems in line with
the weighing of memorial evidence of the lineup mem-
bers against each other (Lindsay & Wells 1985), which
would be a diagnostic process.3 Alternatively, if the eye-
witness relies on a guessing process (Penrod et al. 2005;
Wells et al. 2012), it implies that the relative/familiarity
judgment is discrete, like the 1HT model, which means
that the guessing process relies on zero mnemonic infor-
mation (a “lucky guess”). Therefore, relying on a relative
judgment strategy in this situation provides no diagnos-
tic information to the witness. The lineup member that
the witness believes looks most like the perpetrator is no
more likely to be the actual perpetrator than any of the
other lineup members. Therefore, the decision process
would be completely random, as if rolling a die, and
choosing the actual perpetrator would be a lucky guess.
In this case, even though the decision process is subject-
ively continuous to the witness (i.e. he or she is choosing
the person that is “most like” the perpetrator), it can
nevertheless be modeled by a non-diagnostic, discrete-
state process like the 1HT.
To reiterate, our dual-process interpretation is not the
only way to instantiate relative judgment theory, but it
does allow for a test regarding how the information
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to the dual-process view of relative judgment theory,
non-recollected faces in a simultaneous lineup would be
subject to a relative judgment process. This process
could be continuous, and therefore diagnostic of guilt,
or it could be discrete, implying a non-diagnostic guess-
ing process. We will empirically test discrete-state and
continuous model predictions using a task similar to
eyewitness ID. In doing so, we aim to better understand
the recognition evidence that mediates these decisions
so as to better inform theory.
Empirical evidence for discrete-state and continuous
mediation
Discrete-state and continuous models make different
predictions about the shape of receiver operating charac-
teristic (ROC) curves. ROC curves are constructed by
plotting the hit rate and false alarm rate at each level of
response bias (i.e. willingness to label an item as “Old”).
Response bias is often assessed using confidence judg-
ments (Wixted 2007; Yonelinas & Parks 2007), with high
confidence signaling a more conservative response bias
and low confidence signaling a more liberal response
bias. Discrete-state mediation predicts linear ROCs,
whereas continuous mediation predicts curvilinear
ROCs. However, empirical evidence from the basic rec-
ognition memory literature almost always produces
curvilinear ROC curves (Wixted 2007), supporting a
continuous mediation of recognition memory.
Our dual-process view of relative judgment theory,
likewise, makes predictions regarding the shape of eye-
witness ROC curves. If non-recollected stimuli possess
zero mnemonic information (discrete), the ROC will be
linear. However, if the non-recollected stimuli are con-
tinuously mediated, a curvilinear ROC will result. Recent
studies reporting ROCs of simultaneous lineups appear
to show curvilinear ROCs (e.g. Gronlund et al. 2012;
Mickes 2015; Wetmore et al., 2015). However, there are
two problems with relying on ROC shape to differentiate
continuous and discrete mediation accounts.
One problem is that eyewitness ROC curves are trun-
cated because they involve plotting only suspect IDs (see
Gronlund, Wixted & Mickes 2014; **Wixted & Mickes,
2012). This truncation can make it challenging to assess
the shape of the ROC curve. The second problem is that
the predictions made by discrete-state models can mimic
curvilinear ROC curves (e.g. Broder & Shutz, 2009;
Malmberg, 2002; Province & Rouder 2012; but see Chen,
Starns, & Rotello 2015). Province and Rouder refer spe-
cifically to the effect of relaxing the certainty assumption
(Luce 1963). The certainty assumption posits that under
discrete-state mediation, all “detect” items are recog-
nized with high confidence and only “guess” items can
be recognized with a range of low to high confidence.This assumption leads to the linear ROCs that the model
predicts. However, Province and Rouder showed that if
you relax the certainty assumption and allow for the
possibility that detected items can be recognized with a
broader range of confidence, a discrete-state model can
indeed predict curvilinear ROCs. Recently, Kellen,
Erdfelder, Malmberg, Dube, and Criss (2016) showed
that an alternative discrete model (the low-threshold
model, Luce 1963), which assumes that New items can
exceed a threshold for detection, also can approximate
empirical ROC curves. Therefore, ROC analysis is
unable to definitively test between discrete-state and
continuous mediation.
If ROC analysis will not distinguish between con-
tinuous and discrete mediation, another measure is
needed. Kellen and Klauer (2014) provided one such
measure. In their study, participants were presented
with a list of 270 words; 135 words were presented
once (weak encoding, W) and 135 words were pre-
sented three times (strong encoding, S). At test, partic-
ipants were presented with three-word, target present
arrays (their Experiment 2) and were told to rank each
of the words from “Most likely to have been seen be-
fore” to “Least likely to have been seen before.” The
critical measure was the conditional probability that
the actually-studied target of the array was ranked sec-
ond, given that it was not chosen as most likely to
have been seen before (c2).
The c2 measure requires minimal assumptions (in
contrast to ROC analysis). For example, the certainty
assumption has no effect on c2. Moreover, c2 evalu-
ates the most fundamental prediction of discrete and
continuous models. In a discrete-state model, al-
though strong items would be more likely to be
ranked first (DO
S > DO
W), if a strong target was not
identified as old, it would have an equal likelihood of
being ranked second or third because judgments re-
garding these items must arise from the guess state.
In a guess state, the amount of mnemonic informa-
tion is zero, regardless of whether the tested item ac-
tually was strong or weak. This leads to equal c2
predictions for strong versus weak items, even though
the average hit rate of strong items (strong items
ranked first) would be greater than the average hit
rate of weak items. According to a continuous model,
however, strong items, on average, have a greater
strength than weak items. Therefore, if a strong target
was not ranked first, it would nevertheless have a
greater likelihood of being ranked second than a weak
target because it would fall higher (on average) in the
target distribution (see Kellen & Klauer 2014, for
proofs). In sum, the predictions regarding c2 under a
discrete-state model are: c2
S = c2
W, but predictions re-
garding c2 under a continuous model are: c2
S > c2
W.
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(2014) found evidence supporting a continuous model
(c2
S = 0.63 > c2
W = 0.55, Exp. 2).
In order to evaluate our interpretation of the relative
judgment theory, we utilized the same paradigm and c2
measure as Kellen and Klauer (2014) to test whether
memory for faces is mediated by continuous or discrete
processes. There is theoretical and practical merit in
using faces rather than words as our critical stimuli. For
example, words are processed and encoded differently
than faces. Olivares, Iglesias, and Rodriquez-Holguin
(2003) found evidence of separate linguistic and non-
linguistic event-related potentials when comparing the
N400 component using facial and non-facial stimuli,
which suggests that the brain processes these stimuli dif-
ferently at the neural level. Additionally, separate, spe-
cialized modules used in the processing of faces and
visual words have been identified using fMRI (Kanwisher
2010). These studies suggest that recognition and pro-
cessing of faces and words are not homologous at all
levels. Additionally, eyewitness tasks, inside and out of
the laboratory, require encoding and recognizing novel
faces, which differs from encoding and recognizing
known words.
Kellen and Klauer (2014) found evidence of continu-
ous mediation for words in a ranking task, adding to the
body of ROC evidence suggesting that recognition mem-
ory is driven by continuous mediation. Experiment 1
could replicate these findings and extend Kellen and
Klauer’s results to faces. Alternatively, the evidence indi-
cating that faces are processed differently from words
suggests the possibility that recognition of faces may be
mediated differently than words. According to the dual-
process view of the relative judgment theory, evidence of
continuous mediation would signal that relative judg-
ments (in the absence of recollection) involve the weigh-
ing of diagnostic memorial evidence (like SDT), but
evidence of discrete-state mediation would be indicative
of a reliance on a non-diagnostic guessing process (as in
the 1HT). Experiment 1 sought to elucidate the use of





Participants were 53 undergraduates who participated in
the study in exchange for course credit in an introduc-
tory psychology course.
Procedure
Faces were arbitrarily chosen to be either targets or
fillers and all 53 participants saw the same targets atstudy. During the study phase, participants were
instructed that they would be presented with a series of
faces, one after another, and should try to memorize
each face. After indicating they understood the instruc-
tions, participants viewed 100 male Caucasian faces
(aged 20–40 years) for 1000 ms each, separated by
500 ms inter-stimulus fixation crosses. Fifty of the faces
were presented once and 50 were presented a total of
three non-sequential times, for a total of 200 study
events. All 200 events were presented in a random order
and conditions were counterbalanced between even and
odd numbered participants such that odd numbered
participants studied faces once that even numbered par-
ticipants studied three times and vice versa.
Following the study phase, participants completed 20
arithmetic problems as a distractor. Participants were
instructed that three two-digit numbers would be pre-
sented to them and that the first two numbers may or
may not add up to the third. Participants were told to
press “Y” on their keyboard if the first two numbers
added up to the third number, or “N” if it did not. After
indicating they had read and understood the instruc-
tions, participants viewed the 20 distractor problems.
Following the distractor, participants began the test
phase. Participants were instructed that they would be
presented with an array of three faces, only one of which
had been studied before (the target), and that the pos-
ition of the studied face would be random. Instructions
indicated that the participants were to rank each face
from 1st (most likely to have been seen before) to 3rd
(least likely to have been seen before). Once participants
indicated that they had read and understood the direc-
tions for the test phase, the arrays were presented.
Each array consisted of three faces presented in a row in
the middle of the screen with three check boxes under
each face that read “1st,” “2nd,” and “3rd.” Instructions at
the top of the screen reminded participants to rank each
face from 1st (most likely) to 3rd (least likely) and to only
provide one rank per face. After checking the appropriate
ranking under each face, participants were allowed to
change their rankings until they indicated that their rank-
ings were final and moved on to the next array. Each par-
ticipant completed a total of 100 test trials, 50 with weak
targets and 50 with strong targets.
Results
In order to verify that the encoding manipulation
worked, we compared the average hit rate (i.e. targets
ranked 1st) for the weak targets to the average hit rate
for the strong targets using a dependent t-test. The aver-
age hit rate of the strong targets (M = 0.71, SD = 0.16)
was significantly greater than the average hit rate of the
weak targets (M = 0.52, SD = 0.15) (t(52) = –10.38, p <
0.001). This indicates that faces studied three times were
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the target ranked 1st, 2nd, and 3rd were calculated for
each participant and the means are reported in Table 1.
Critically, we were interested in the conditional prob-
ability of targets ranked 2nd given they were not ranked
1st. Consequently, c2 was calculated for strong and weak
conditions for each participant. A dependent t-test indi-
cated that average c2
S (M = 0.62, SD = 0.15) was signifi-
cantly greater than average c2
W (M = 0.55, SD = 0.11)
(t(52) = 2.82, p < 0.01). A non-parametric test (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test) reached a similar conclusion, indicating
that c2
S was significantly greater than c2
W (V = 375.5, p <
0.01). Cohen’s effect size (d = 0.54) indicated a moderate
effect. Results were also analyzed using the BEST
(Bayesian Estimation Supersedes the t Test) analysis de-
veloped by Kruschke (2013). BEST uses Bayesian infer-
ence to fit data with the t-distribution and provides a
95 % highest density interval (HDI) of possible param-
eter values (i.e. where most of the credible parameter
values fall). The 95 % HDI for the mean of c2
W was
(0.52–0.58, mean estimate of 0.552). The 95 % HDI for
the mean of c2
S was (0.58–0.67, mean estimate of 0.623).
The 95 % HDI for the mean difference was (0.020–0.12,
mean estimate of 0.071). The HDI interval does not in-
clude 0, indicating evidence for a non-zero difference be-
tween c2
W and c2
S. Results supported the hypothesis that
face recognition is continuously mediated, substantiated
by the finding that c2
S was greater than c2
W.4
Discussion
The findings provide supporting evidence for the con-
tinuous mediation of recognition memory for facial
stimuli. However, stronger evidence for continuous me-
diation in eyewitness situations would take the form of
continuous c2 patterns (c2
S > c2
W) when there is a mis-
match of faces between study and test. When an eyewit-
ness views a crime, the face he or she encodes is not a
direct match to the face seen in a subsequent ID proced-
ure. Therefore, it is important to establish that the evi-
dence for continuous mediation in Experiment 1
replicates in a more externally valid situation. We sought
to generalize the Experiment 1 results by implementing
a mismatch similar to what real eyewitnesses to a crimeTable 1 Proportion of weak and strong targets ranked 1st, 2nd,
and 3rd and c2 values for Experiments 1 and 2
Exp. 1 1st 2nd 3rd c2
Weak 0.52 0.26 0.22 0.55
Strong 0.71 0.18 0.12 0.62
Exp. 2 1st 2nd 3rd c2
Weak 0.45 0.31 0.23 0.57
Strong 0.61 0.24 0.15 0.61would experience. To accomplish this, we ran a second
experiment in which the same individuals were seen at
study and test, but the photos of these individuals dif-




Participants were 115 undergraduate students (84
women) aged 18–25 years (M = 18.6, SD = 1.20) who re-
ceived credit in an introductory psychology course in ex-
change for participation.
Procedure
Before the experiment began, participants were pre-
sented with a short practice session. We implemented
this practice session to ensure that participants under-
stood the task before our critical data were collected.
The practice phase exactly matched the study and test
phases in all respects except for the use of female target
faces and the exclusion of a distractor task. Participants
studied five female Caucasian faces (aged 20–40 years)
for 1250 ms, with 500 ms inter-stimulus fixation point,
followed by two practice test trials with instructions
identical to the actual test phase.
Following the practice phase, participants began the
experiment. Participants were instructed that they would
view a series of faces and should memorize these faces.
Once they indicated that they understood the instruc-
tions, 100 male faces were presented in a randomized
order for 1250 ms each, interspersed with a 500 ms
inter-stimulus fixation point. Fifty faces were presented
once in the weak encoding condition, and 50 faces were
presented three non-sequential times in the strong en-
coding condition, for a total of 200 study events. There
were 30 Caucasian faces and 20 African American faces
at each level of encoding. All 100 unique study faces
wore smiles and street clothes. The faces rotated
through the two encoding conditions as in Experiment 1
and, like Experiment 1, faces were arbitrarily chosen to
be either targets or fillers before the experiment was
conducted.
After viewing all 200 study events, participants com-
pleted a distractor task. The distractor task was identical
to Experiment 1 except 40 math questions were com-
pleted. Following the distractor and before the test phase
began, participants were given the same instructions as
in Experiment 1. After indicating that they had read and
understood the instructions, participants began the test
phase.
Arrays contained one target (either weak or strong)
and two new faces presented in a row in the center of
the screen. The faces for each array were randomly
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gets and the fillers from the pre-determined pool of
fillers) and the position of the target was randomly de-
termined for each test trial. In addition, Caucasian and
African American arrays were presented in a random
order. Race never varied within an array. Each face was
labeled underneath as “1,” “2,” and “3” from left to right.
The faces at test all had neutral expressions (as opposed
to happy expressions at study) and wore matching red
shirts (as opposed to street clothes at study). See Fig. 3
for a comparison of faces at study and test. Once a face
was selected, the number under that face was replaced
by “Most Likely,” and participants indicated the face they
believed to be next most likely to have been seen before.
They were given the option to reset their choices by
pressing “0.” Once the second face was selected, it was
relabeled “Next Likely,” and the remaining face was re-
labeled “Least Likely.” Once the rankings were complete,
the participants pressed “Y” to continue to the next trial,
or pressed “N” and the arrays were reset. After all 100
arrays were ranked, participants were debriefed and
dismissed.
Results
To verify the effectiveness of the encoding manipulation,
hit rates of weak and strong targets were compared
using a dependent t-test. The hit rate for strong targets
(M = 0.61, SD = 0.11) was significantly greater than the
hit rate of weak targets (M = 0.45, SD = 0.07) (t(114) =
15.69, p < 0.001). There were no significant differences in
hit rates between weak Caucasian faces (M = 0.45, SD =
0.09) and weak African American faces (M = 0.43, SD =
0.14) (t(114) = 1.67, p = 0.10), nor were there significant
differences in hit rates between strong Caucasian facesFig. 3 Example of faces used at study and test in Experiment 2. Faces at st
test (right, in figure) had neutral expressions and wore a plain red shirt. Stim(M = 0.61, SD = 0.13) and strong African American faces
(M = 0.60, SD = 0.15) (t(114) = 0.47, p = 0.64). The pro-
portions of targets ranked most, next most, and least
likely to have been seen before, are reported in Table 1.
As in Experiment 1, c2 measures for weak and strong
arrays were calculated for each participant. A dependent
t-test revealed c2
S (M = 0.61, SD = 0.11) was significantly
greater than c2
W (M = 0.57, SD = 0.09) (t(114) = 2.38, p =
0.01). A Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealed identical
results, with c2
S significantly greater than c2
W (V = 2379,
p = 0.02). Cohen’s effect size (d = 0.31) indicated a small
to medium effect. Using the BEST analysis, the 95 %
HDI for the mean of c2
W was (0.556–0.590, mean esti-
mate of 0.573). The 95 % HDI for the mean of c2
S was
(0.586–0.627, mean estimate of 0.606). The 95 % HDI
for the mean differences was (0.007–0.061, mean esti-
mate of 0.033), which does not include 0, indicating evi-





Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 (albeit with a
smaller effect), further supporting a continuous model of
memory in faxcial recognition. By using a mismatch of
faces between study and test to better approximate an
eyewitness decision, this experiment provides a more ro-
bust test of the mediation involved in facial recognition,
which allows for a better evaluation of the relative judg-
ment theory. That is, evidence for continuous mediation
using a mismatch paradigm suggests that eyewitness iden-
tification tasks engage continuously mediated processes.
However, it is interesting to note that the modification
that better approximates the eyewitness situation (i.e. mis-
match of faces at test and study in Experiment 2) miti-
gated the effect size and Bayesian evidence. This findingudy (left, in figure) were smiling and wearing street clothes. Faces at
uli taken from Meissner, Brigham, & Butz (2005)
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using closer approximations to the true eyewitness task,
an issue we will explore in more detail in the General
discussion.
General discussion
The goal of these experiments was to better understand
the relative judgment theory proposed by Lindsay and
Wells (1985) and Wells et al. (2012) in light of evidence
for discrete-state or continuous mediation in eyewitness-
like paradigms. The theory is important to examine be-
cause of its proliferation in the eyewitness literature and
its impact on policy decisions. However, because the the-
ory is verbally specified, it is challenging to tie formal
models of recognition memory to it, as evidenced by the
fact that both continuous and discrete-state mediation
appear germane to different instantiations of the theory.
We chose to reconcile this problem using a dual-process
interpretation, where upon the failure of recollection
(and the reliance on relative judgments), eyewitnesses
may either guess among alternatives (a discrete, non-
diagnostic process), or compare continuous evidence
among alternatives (a diagnostic process). The current
studies found evidence of continuous mediation in an
eyewitness-like situation using the simultaneous pres-
entation of options. Our evidence suggests that con-
tinuous evidence meaningfully mediates simultaneous
lineup decisions and that according to a dual-process
implementation, a version of relative judgment theory
that relies on a discrete recollective process should be
coupled with a continuous diagnostic relative-judgment
process.5
Our findings stand contrary to a reliance on lucky
guesses in the absence of recollection (guessing with
zero mnemonic information). Consequently, it is discre-
diting to eyewitnesses, and misleading to policymakers,
to state that some ostensibly correct eyewitness deci-
sions arise from a non-diagnostic process. In contrast,
according to the continuous mediation perspective, ID
decisions are made at differing levels of confidence.
Consequently, rather than choosing an ID procedure
that purportedly reduces relative judgments (the sequen-
tial lineup), policymakers instead should determine the
confidence level below which an ID decision is consid-
ered too unreliable: not because low-confidence deci-
sions are more likely to have arisen from a guess, but
because as confidence decreases, accuracy decreases (e.g.
Palmer, Brewer, Weber, & Nagesh 2013; Wixted et al.
2015).
Other tests of relative judgment theory
Clark’s (2003) WITNESS model has been used to ex-
plore other aspects of relative judgment theory. For ex-
ample, Clark and Gronlund (2015) offered an alternativeexplanation for the primary evidence offered in favor of
a reliance on relative judgments (Wells 1993; see also
Clark & Davey 2005). Wells (1993) randomly assigned
participants to view either a target present lineup or a
target removed lineup (a lineup from which the guilty
suspect was removed and not replaced). Wells argued
that if witnesses are making absolute judgments, those
who could have identified the guilty suspect, had he
been present, should reject the target removed lineup
because the guilty suspect is not present. However, if
witnesses are making relative judgments, those witnesses
who could have selected the guilty suspect will exhibit
what is referred to as a target-to-foil shift, and instead
select the next best option from the target removed
lineup. Wells found that most participants did not reject
the target removed lineup and instead shifted their
choices to the fillers. They interpreted this finding as
evidence that simultaneous lineup decisions were made
using relative judgments, as defined by relative judgment
theory (Lindsay & Wells 1985; Wells 1984). But Clark
and Gronlund (2015) used the WITNESS model to fit
the Wells (1993) data using an absolute decision process,
which suggests that a target-to-foil shift is not proof of
the use of a relative judgment strategy in simultaneous
lineups. Clark and Gronlund offered an alternative ex-
planation based on continuous mediation. Whenever at
least two lineup members have strength values above a
decision criterion, then the “next-best” lineup member
would be chosen if the best match was removed from
the lineup.
It is important to note that the concerns our data have
raised regarding the diagnosticity of relative judgments
refer to one possible formal implementation of the the-
ory proposed by Wells and colleagues (i.e. one that in-
cludes a non-diagnostic guessing process). Our data
should not be construed as an indictment of the act of
comparing faces in a lineup. In fact, comparing faces
may have beneficial effects on eyewitness performance.
Wixted and Mickes (2014) proposed a SDT-based model
that posits that witnesses use distinguishing, diagnostic
features of lineup members to inform their choices. In a
simultaneous lineup, witnesses compare among fillers,
not because they have shifted to a non-diagnostic
process, but in order to eliminate shared features that
are not diagnostic and focus on those that are. For ex-
ample, if all lineup members have brown hair, witnesses
should not use that feature to inform their decision. The
diagnostic-feature detection theory can also explain how
witnesses approach sequential lineups. When faces are
not presented all at once, witnesses have a difficult time
determining which features are diagnostic. As the se-
quential lineup unfolds, however, witnesses can begin to
discern which features are shared by all lineup members
viewed so far (and thus are non-diagnostic) and which
McAdoo and Gronlund Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2016) 1:11 Page 10 of 12features are potentially unique to the perpetrator. This
is one reason why sequential lineup performance
sometimes matches simultaneous lineup performance
(e.g. Gronlund et al. 2012) if the suspect (guilty or
innocent) is positioned later in the sequential lineup
(Carlson et al. 2008; Gronlund, Carlson, Dailey, &
Goodsell 2009; for a similar explanation for sequential
position effects, see Goodsell, Gronlund, & Carlson
2010). However, a determination of whether (or when)
eyewitnesses make comparative judgments among
faces in a lineup can only be made when the compo-
nent processes are formally specified and clear-cut
predictions can be derived.
Future directions
There is a good deal of variability in the c2 measures in
our sample (as was the case in Kellen & Klauer 2014,
see their Figure Four). Some participants displayed pat-
terns that mimicked discrete-state mediation. Although
this could be statistical noise, as would be expected
when considering a small portion of trials (i.e. misses), it
is also possible that some participants adopt strategies
during the ranking procedure that produce discrete-state
c2 patterns. Recently, Kellen and Klauer (2015) found
evidence for discrete-state mediation using a similar
paradigm to Kellen and Klauer (2014), except that confi-
dence ratings of individual items replaced the ranking
judgments for arrays of items. It appears that the task
(confidence ratings rather than ranking judgments) can
cause participants to adopt a discrete strategy. A study
using confidence ratings should be done to determine if
the same pattern holds for faces. This study also would
be important given the call for the use of confidence
judgments to construct ROC curves to assess eyewitness
performance (Gronlund et al. 2015; Wixted & Mickes
2012). Kellen et al. (2016) also found that Luce’s (1963)
discrete low-threshold model fit the Kellen and Klauer
(2014) ranking data as well as did a continuous SDT
model. Clearly, more work needs to be done to under-
stand the c2 ranking paradigm, as well as determine
what factors, or strategies, affect when recognition mem-
ory is found to be continuously or discretely mediated.
These include factors that distinguish an eyewitness situ-
ation from the typical laboratory study.
Experiment 2 was our first foray into better approxi-
mating an eyewitness situation and the mismatch of
faces from study to test mitigated the c2 differences be-
tween strong and weak items. That is, Experiment 1 had
a Cohen’s d of 0.54 and a 95 % HDI of mean differences
(0.020–0.12) that contained a lower estimate further
from zero than Experiment 2, which had a smaller
Cohen’s d of 0.31, a 95 % HDI of mean differences
(0.007–0.061), and a lower bound closer to zero. One
possible explanation for the decreasing effect size mayhave arisen due to perceived task differences: Experi-
ment 1 is a simple matching task (the photos from study
to test were identical), whereas Experiment 2 requires a
participant to make a determination whether this differ-
ent photo corresponds to the same person studied previ-
ously. The matching task in Experiment 1 seems
amenable to weighing memorial evidence against a sim-
ple criterion (continuous processing). Experiment 2, on
the other hand, because it is more difficult cognitively,
may (sometimes) engender more than just a matching
process. If there is more than simple evidence-weighing
going on (e.g. participants’ decisions are confirmed by
recollection), it could mitigate the c2 results in Experi-
ment 2. More work is needed to understand this possible
task complexity effect, which can be achieved, in part, by
follow-up experiments that more closely approximate
the eyewitness situation.
How will other factors that characterize the eyewitness
task influence the degree of continuous versus discrete me-
diation? For example, the current studies randomly selected
the fillers in each array so that each participant would not
see the same array composition as other participants. How-
ever, in an eyewitness situation, fillers are not chosen at
random, but rather matched to the description of the sus-
pect in order to increase lineup fairness. This prevents a
suspect from standing out among the fillers. Future studies
using the c2 paradigm should construct arrays that vary in
fairness and evaluate how this factor impacts memory me-
diation. If the target stands out from the fillers (biased), par-
ticipants may adopt a discrete-like strategy, whereby the
“obvious” target is ranked as first and remaining choices are
distributed arbitrarily. In unbiased arrays, on the other
hand, where faces closely resemble one another, partici-
pants may have to adopt a more continuous strategy in
order to differentiate among the faces.
Another way to better approximate the eyewitness
situation is to introduce the presence of innocent sus-
pects via target absent arrays. In the current studies, all
arrays were target present and participants were aware
of this composition. However, the knowledge that some
arrays do not contain targets may invite more partici-
pants to more consistently adopt continuously mediated
strategies, reducing the percentage of participants whose
summary data strayed from the average. Fair lineups and
target absent situations are commonplace in the eyewit-
ness literature (Clark 2008; Fitzgerald, Price, Oriet, &
Charman 2013) and if patterns of c2 integrating these
variables continue to support continuous mediation of
facial recognition, it will further strengthen the case that
continuous evidence mediates eyewitness identification.
Conclusions
The main goal of our studies was to evaluate the relative
judgment theory (Lindsay & Wells 1985; Wells 1984;
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discrete and continuous conceptualizations of facial rec-
ognition memory through the use of a dual-process
model. We used a critical test developed by Kellen and
Klauer (2014) and found evidence for continuous medi-
ation, a finding that requires the re-examination of some
of the tenets of the relative judgment theory, in particu-
lar, the idea that illegitimate hits are the result of a
discrete, or non-diagnostic, guessing process when recol-
lection does not occur. As we have noted, we are not the
first to raise concerns about this theory (e.g. Clark &
Gronlund 2015). It is our view that a more productive
approach toward theorizing in eyewitness ID should in-
volve use of formally specified models (also see Clark
2008) that seek to explain a wide range of eyewitness
phenomena (e.g. the WITNESS model, Clark 2003; the
diagnostic feature model, Wixted & Mickes 2014). Un-
derstanding the mechanisms underlying eyewitness ID is
of paramount importance. If we can better understand
the processes governing an eyewitness decision, we can
better inform policymakers regarding how eyewitness
evidence should be collected and utilized by the criminal
justice system.
Endnotes
1It is important to note that we refer to the term “rela-
tive judgment” as the explanation described by Lindsay
and Wells, and not the act of comparing faces in a
lineup. In fact, as we discuss later, comparing faces can
have beneficial effects on eyewitness performance
(Wixted & Mickes, 2014). We will refer to the latter as
comparative judgments to keep this idea separate from
relative judgment as an explanation.
2There are other dual-process models that make differ-
ent assumptions regarding recollection (e.g. Rotello,
Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004; Wixted & Mickes, 2010),
but the Yonelinas model fits the language of the relative
judgment theory best.
3Wells et al. (2012) refer to hits made using relative/fa-
miliarity processes as illegitimate and therefore non-
diagnostic, regardless of whether the process is continu-
ous or discrete. This is contrary to what Yonelinas pro-
posed regarding familiarity (unless d’ = 0). We believe
that a continuous relative/familiarity process would be
diagnostic and only a discrete, guessing process should
be considered non-diagnostic.
4All data are available in the Open Science Framework
at https://osf.io/rdu2v/.
5Because the relative-absolute judgment strategy may
allow for a mixture of discrete and continuous processes,
one could suppose that the c2 paradigm will only find
evidence supporting discrete mediation when the rele-
vant processes on all trials are purely discrete. In a new
experiment similar to Experiment 2, we had participantsreport their confidence in their first choice. Even when
we limited our c2 calculation to only those trials in
which participants reported being highly confident in
the choice ranked first, we found the same c2 advantage
(c2
S = 0.63, c2
W = 0.56). One would think that if discrete
mediation was ever occurring, it would occur more often
for these high confidence decisions. That is, a participant
might reason that, because he or she is certain that the
face ranked first is a previously studied face, a partici-
pant would arbitrarily assign ranks to the remaining al-
ternatives. But we found this was not the case,
suggesting that even arrays involving high-confidence
rankings were processed continuously.
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